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Abstract 
This paper investigates peer effects in the take up of a welfare programme, free school meals, using 
the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) which collects data on every child attending school 
in England. To explore the nature of the peer effect, I examine two potential channels: stigma, and 
information. To disentangle these channels I first exploit the fact that in a number of schools cashless 
catering systems have been implemented which remove the stigma associated with claiming the 
benefit; to investigate the impact of this innovation, telephone interviews were conducted with over 
400 schools to ascertain whether and when such systems had been introduced. Second, I test whether 
information plays a role by comparing the peer effect for those who have claimed in previous years 
with those who have not. The results suggest the presence of stigma dampens the peer effect and 
information makes it larger. Information is found to be a more important part of the peer effect for 
those living in areas of greater deprivation and stigma is more important for those in the least deprived 
regions. The policy implication of this is that in areas of greater deprivation information campaigns 
will have a greater marginal impact than those that attempt to remove visible stigma. 
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1 Introduction
Many low income families in the UK forgo around £400 a year by not participating in the
free school meals programme. Around 25% of those who are eligible do not take up their
entitlement, affecting over 300,000 children.1 Peers and social networks can contribute to
participation in such welfare programmes; Bertrand et al (2000). While it is thought that
information and stigma determine the magnitude of any peer effect, distinguishing between
these two elements is typically difficult and also important as they have very different policy
implications. In this paper I examine the role of peer effects in the enrolment decision of
the UK’s largest food based welfare programme.
Understanding the role peers play in the decision to register free school meal eligibility
can shed light on non take-up of not only this benefit, but also social assistance in general,
and helps in determining the barriers to participation. Typically cited reasons for not
claiming are social in nature. In a survey about free school meals2 33% of pupils and
40% of parents cited embarrassment as a key driver for not taking a free school meal, and
11% of eligible parents had not claimed because they were not aware they were entitled
or had insufficient information about the programme. Tackling these social barriers is
important in trying to alleviate child poverty and inequality of provision in government
services (Heckman and Smith (2004)). In other areas of related policy intervention such as
those aimed at tackling obesity through food education and physical activity, it has been
found that those from poorer backgrounds are less likely to respond (Summerbell et. al
(2009)), if at all, exacerbating the problem of inequality of provision.
To test whether peers have an impact in free school meal enrolment I use a large
administrative data set on English school children, the Pupil Level Annual School Census
(PLASC). This records information on all children attending school and includes whether
the pupil is registered for free school meals. The main advantage of this data is that I
am able to directly observe all the pupils within the peer group. Second, I can identify
individuals and their peers according to year group, school or small neighbourhood areas.
To complement this data set I use the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England
(LSYPE) that has more detailed family background information. Finally, I use a completely
unique data set compiled by a telephone survey that elicited whether schools use cashless
catering systems or not. Over 400 secondary schools were contacted.
While Bertrand et al (2000), Aslund and Fredrickson (2009) focused only on establishing
a network effect, increasingly the literature attempts to examine the nature of that effect.
Typically, information is a prominent feature of most studies related to social networks.
1The School Food Trust
2Storey and Chamberlin (2001)
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One way that has been investigated is through experiments. Duflo and Saez (2002) ran a
randomised experiment giving information regarding retirement plans. Defining the peer
groups as co-workers, they find small but significant effects of providing information through
social interactions. In the absence of experimental methods other techniques are used to
gauge what encompasses the peer effect. Aizer and Currie (2004) examine the use of pre-
natal care in California. To test the importance of information, they compare the network
effect between first and second time mothers. They conjecture that information should
not be relevant for second time users of pre-natal care as they are already aware of the
services that are available. Finding that the network effect for second births is of similar
magnitude to first time births suggests that information is not an important factor. This
is in contrast to Heckman and Smith (2004), who in examining a job training programme,
decompose participation at different stages, and find that for non-whites involvement is
primarily determined by knowledge of the programme.
Devillanova (2008) investigates the use of health care among undocumented immigrants
in Italy and directly examines the information channel. He finds a large significant impact
of information from friends and relatives, reducing the time to a health related visit by
around 30%. This network effect is smaller for better educated individuals. The relative
importance of information appears to differ according to the setting. The seeming puzzle
for the lack of information playing a role found in Aizer and Currie (2004) could be due
to stable conditions and information being relatively widespread, hence reducing the role
that networks can facilitate in this area. This is not necessarily the case when the surveyed
population are immigrants, particularly undocumented, where information from the peer
group is more likely to have an impact. Figlio et al. (2011) test the role of information when
the environment is not stable. The welfare reforms in the mid-1990s in the US, although not
necessarily changing the eligibility criteria for programmes such as the Medicaid and WIC,
did cause confusion particularly for immigrant groups. They call this an information shock
and exploit it to test the role that networks play when there is a disruption to information.
Interestingly, they find that in the short run networks have an impact at mitigating any
reductions in information that there may have been.
Unusually, I can examine the peer effect in an environment where information and then
stigma is not present for the same programme. The rich administrative, rather than more
typically used survey data, allow for this to be examined in a national context covering
all pupils in the country. The peer group is defined as those within the same ethnic
and language group. The assumption made is that parents and children are more likely
to interact with those of the same ethnic background and even more so if they share a
common language. I use the spatial variation of these groups and the differences in national
rates in participation in the free school meal programme to test for the presence of peer
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effects. I am able to control for various omitted variables using this data including area
fixed effects for areas that are typically much smaller in size than many other studies that
use neighbourhoods to define peers, and also ethnic language fixed effects to account for
differences in these groups.
The baseline results suggest that the presence of peers increases the effect of a hypo-
thetical policy change by around 20%. I also examine how this varies according to whether
the pupil speaks English as a first language or not. By matching in English test scores at
various ages I find greater English proficiency is associated with a diminished peer effect,
these results all suggest that information plays an important role. I rule out that what I
find is driven by the presence of bilingual ethnic minority staff at school, or if the local
authority provides application materials in other languages or translation help.
To test the contribution of information more directly I propose a test similar to Aizer
and Currie (2004). If information makes up the peer effect then it should be smaller in
magnitude for those who have previously claimed, I find this is the case. To examine the
magnitude of the peer effect when stigma is removed I exploit a natural policy experiment.
Many schools have been introducing cashless catering systems, similar to the electronic
benefit transfer. These remove the visible stigma associated with the social assistance pro-
gramme as they eradicate the differentiation between those students who pay and those
who have a free school meal entitlement. Therefore the peer effect is examined when stigma
is absent; when this is the case the estimated impact of hypothetical policy changes are
greater. This implies that when visible stigma is present it has a negative effect, damp-
ening enrolment. These effects are heterogeneous across levels of income and education
deprivation. Information is found to be a more important part of the peer effect for those
in areas of greater deprivation and stigma is more important for those in the least deprived.
This has important policy implications, suggesting that campaigns aimed at improving in-
formation will have a greater marginal effect in more deprived areas. In contrast, efforts
to remove the visible element of stigma have a greater marginal impact in the better off
areas.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents the background to the pro-
gramme (section 2). Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 sets
out the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Background: History of Free School Meals
School meals were first introduced in 1906 as a result of the Education (Provision of Meals)
Act. This gave Local Education Authorities (LEAs) the ability to provide food for children
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whose education was suffering as a result of malnourishment34 Prior to that there had been
a number of local schemes in London and Manchester that had introduced meals at school
for the very poorest, but the 1906 act was seen as the foundation for the current service.
A moderate payment was expected for the meal, while free or reduced meals were only
allowed for those deemed malnourished, Davies (2005). Where the 1906 act was moderate
in only allowing the local authority to provide meals, the 1944 Education act was more
radical in stipulating that LEAs make available school meals (and milk) in both primary
and secondary schools, for the most deprived this was to be free where possible. The
obligation to provide a school meal was removed by the 1980 Education Act, however the
free school meal provision remained.
Changes to the programme over the last 25 years have been mainly concerned with the
quality of the meal. The 1986 Education Act and 1986 Social Security Act saw further
changes to the school meals service, they were put out to competitive tendering and the
criteria for claiming the meal changed. Family Credit replaced the Family Income Supple-
ment resulting in many children no longer being entitled to free school meals. The criteria
have been based on claiming other benefits and an income threshold; the current criteria
are discussed in section 4. The 1980 Act also saw the removal of the nutritional standards.
Very basic food standards were introduced in 2001, however there was no monitoring pro-
cess put in place. The decline in quality of the meals was highlighted when in 2004 celebrity
chef Jamie Oliver went into the London borough of Greenwich and drastically reformed
the school lunches, replacing junk food with healthy alternatives. This was broadcast in
a documentary on a major UK TV station, Channel 4. Since then there has been an im-
provement in the quality of the meals across the country with nutritional standards being
enforced by a non-governmental agency, The School Food Trust.
3 Data
The data for this study come from a number of sources. The Pupil Level Annual School
Census (PLASC) contains information on all pupils in England and Wales and consists of
approximately seven million records per year. Three years of the school census, from 2007
3Curtis (1967)
4A further motivation for the introduction of such an arrangement came from the health of the army
recruits for the Boer War which ended in 1902. The height requirement for entry was decreased as the
working class men were failing to meet it, Davies (2005), (Colquhoun et al 2001). The meals were seen as
a way to address this issue. Interestingly the National School Lunch Programme, which was established
40 years later in 1946 in the US, came about as a reaction to the health conditions, due to poor nutrition,
of men drafted into the US army for the Second World War.
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to 20095, are used in the baseline estimates. This data set has the advantage of including
all those with whom a pupil interacts and therefore I am able to construct detailed accurate
information on the peer group. I supplement this data with test scores from the National
Pupil Database, which records all centrally organised key stage test results. The PLASC
data includes the following characteristics: gender; ethnicity; age; month of birth; whether
English is a first language; a special educational needs (SEN) indicator (including whether a
statement6 is issued; this measures some degree of learning difficulty); the mode of transport
taken to get to school7; a number of location indicators including, lower layer super output
area (LSOA) and middle layer super output area (MSOA), an income deprivation affecting
children index (IDACI); school attended; and free school meal registration participation.
To supplement the PLASC data the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England
(LSYPE) is also used. The LSYPE began in 2004 with a sample of around 21,000 pupils
and 15,000 households, in year 9 (aged 13 and 14, born between 1st September 1989 and
31st August 1990) and followed the students each year. The number of deprived schools
was over-sampled by a factor of 1.5.8 In addition there were sample boosts related to free
school meals and ethnicity. Most importantly, the LSYPE can be linked to the PLASC data,
therefore we are able to use the peer group that is constructed from the entire population,
rather than just the LSYPE sample which could be quite a big problem, Micklewright,
Schnepf and Silva (2010).
Moreover, I have an entirely unique dataset on the schools that operate a cashless
catering system equivalent to the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) systems that operate
in the US Food Stamps programme, although not all operate through a strict card system9.
By phone survey, 406 schools were contacted in order to collect data on whether they
implement a cashless catering system and in which year this was introduced.
The PLASC data has a number of key features that generate the definition of peer
group. This is composed of two main parts, the social reference group and a measure of
proximity. For the reference group I use the child’s ethnicity. Although the exact language
that is spoken in the home is not known, instead I do know whether the child speaks English
5Other specifications later in the paper use data from 2006-2009, for example in section 6.8 to test the
role of stigma. The restriction of just three years in the baseline results is primarily for computational
reasons, with relevant sample selections described in the main body of the text and including those three
years results in approximately 3.8 million observations. The results are indifferent to which 3 years are
chosen.
6A statement is issued after an assessment is made by the local authority, it describes the need that the
pupil has and the help that they should receive. It is typically issued if the child needs a large amount of
extra help or if they were not progressing under the lesser degrees of special need called school action and
school action plus
7Available from 2007 onwards. This is an additional reason for restricting the sample from 2007 onwards
to include as many controls as possible.
8LSYPE user guide, page 6
9Section 6.8 examines the different types of system that are currently in use.
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at home, or more precisely whether or not the language they were exposed to in early years
at home was English or not.10 Therefore using ethnic language group is defined as the
interaction of ethnicity and whether the child’s first language is English. Evidence suggests
that race or ethnicity are strong predictors of social ties, Mayer and Puller (2008) have
recently shown this using data from Facebook. Going beyond just using race or ethnicity
as used by Borjas (1995), language is arguably a better measure of social ties; although
all teaching is carried out in English, it seems plausible that there will be greater social
ties among those who are more likely to share a common language. Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2004) find that two countries that share a common language are more likely to
trust each other.
The second part of the peer group is based on location. Being agnostic about the spread
of peer groups, two broad distinctions of the location of peers are made. The first is at
the school level; as we use data from the school census we know which school the pupil
attended and in which year group within that school they are in. The second is based
on area of residence, the area the child lives in is given in some detail. There are two
super output areas (SOAs), geographical definitions of areas used for the main (not school)
census, as my definition of a peer group at the regional level that defines the peer group.
The smallest areas I have available are the Lower Layer SOAs (LSOA) of which there
are 34,378 in England and Wales with an average population of 1,500. There are 7,193
Middle Layer SOAs (MSOA); these are therefore somewhat bigger with approximately
7,200 residents. The largest area used in the analysis is the Local Education Authority
(LEA), where schools11 are under the jurisdiction of one of the 150 LEAs. Figure 1 shows
the percentage of free school meal eligibility in each MSOA (left) and LSOA (right) for
just one local authority, Essex. The figure indicates variation of free school meal enrolment
across the county. It also allows us to make a comparison between the size of MSOAs and
LSOAs. As a further comparison, and to present the largest area available, Figure 2 shows
the variation across the whole country at the Local Education Authority level.
Given that the vast majority of pupils are white and speak English as a first language,
using ethnic language group for this section of the population would not necessarily be a
good proxy for their peer group12, therefore I exclude the white British and those from
other white backgrounds from the analysis, in addition those with unknown ethnicities or
those who refused to allow their ethnicity to be recorded are also dropped from the sample.
10The definition from the school census is the following: ‘The language to which the child was exposed
during early development and continues to use this language in the home or in the community. If a child
acquires English subsequent to early development, then English is not their first language no matter how
proficient in it they become.”
11Not all schools are under direct control of the local authority, e.g. academies.
12In appendix section A4 I relax this assumption and include white British in the sample.
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This leaves 32 ethnic language groups, with approximately 1,300,000 observations per year.
In section 6.6 I examine the sensitivity of the results from the exclusion of these different
classifications. The dependent variable throughout the paper is free school meal enrolment
(the eligibility has been registered); this is recorded in the census as the following:
Pupils should be recorded as eligible (true) only if a claim for free school meals
has been made by them or on their behalf by parents and either (a) the rele-
vant authority has confirmed their eligibility and a free school meal is currently
being provided for them, or (b) the school or the LEA have seen the necessary
documentation (for example, an Income Support order book) that supports their
eligibility, and the administration of the free meal is to follow as a matter of
process. Conversely, if pupils are in receipt of a free meal but there is confirma-
tion that they are no longer eligible and entitlement will be revoked false should
be applied.
Note that this does not require the child to consume the meal every day, or at all. This
defines our dependent variable which is a dummy indicating whether the child’s eligibility
is recorded as true (1) or false(0).
The eligibility for Free School Meals is set nationally and administered by the local
authority and the school. The criteria for claiming Free School Meals was as follows:
• Income Support
• Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance
• Support under part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
• Child Tax Credit, provided they are not entitled to Working Tax Credit
• An annual income (as assessed by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) did not
exceed: £13,910 in 2005, £14,155 in 2006, £14,495 in 2007, £15,575 in 2008, and
£16,040 in 2009.
• The Guarantee element of State Pension Credit
• An income-related employment and support allowance (introduced in October 2008)
In order to be eligible at least one of these criteria has to be satisfied. Claims can
be made to the local authority in charge of administering free school meals. Completion
of a form13 of around two to three pages, depending on the local authority, is required.
13An example of a form can be found at the following: http://www.essex.gov.uk/Education-
Schools/Schools/Pupil-Parent-Support/Documents/FSM%20app%20form%20Sept%202010.pdf
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There are also three sections: section 1 asks for parent and pupil details, section 2 asks for
financial details, and section 3 is a declaration.
As mentioned, the advantage of using the PLASC data is that I have the entire pop-
ulation of the potential peers. Also, there are different layers of the peer group measure.
All the potential contacts within a school are known, and further I know the area where
someone lives as another potential avenue of social interaction. In section 3 I defined the
broad peer group as those who share the same ethnicity and whether they speak English
at home or not. In this section I set out in more detail the peer group measure considered.
The baseline method is that of Bertrand et al (2000). This is defined using the interaction
of “quantity” and “quality” of peers. This gives a measure of the degree of interaction
that an individual has (quantity), and also the extent of the welfare use of those individ-
uals (quality). I define quantity, capturing the strength of the peer measure, as contact
availability (CAslt) using the following:
ln
Cslt/Ast
Llt/St
where Cslt is the number of people in the school or area who belong to the ethnic
language group l at time t, Ast is the total number of students in school s at time t;
(therefore the numerator is the percentage in the location of the individuals in that ethnic
language group); and Llt/St, the denominator, is the share of the school population in
schools of that ethnic language group at time t. The denominator serves as a normalisation
which prevents less prevalent ethnic language groups from being under weighted.
Quality is measured through information and attitude of school welfare of those in
the same ethnic language group within the same school or area. We proxy for this using
(FSM (−i)lt − FSM (−i)t) the deviation from the global free school meal mean of the whole
population from the mean free school meal use of the ethnic language group. This measure
captures cultural differences towards welfare and to the free school meal programme in
general. Groups with higher levels of free school meal eligibility will have more information
about the system and are more likely to have information about the eligibility criteria.
They are also less likely to exert negative social pressure such as stigma.
Peer Measureslt =(CAslt) ×(FSM (−i)l(t) − FSM (−i)t)
The intuition behind the interaction term is that if you are part of an ethnic language
group that is high welfare (FSM) using, or has a culture of welfare use, and if a peer effects
exists you are more likely to adopt that welfare programme if you are surrounded by people
of your own ethnic language group. Therefore, if one lives in an ethnic language enclave
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and that ethnic language is a high welfare participating group then if peer effects exist then
you are more likely to participate14
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. For
2008 the percentage of free school meal pupils for the whole population is 15% compared
to 25% in our sample. In addition to gender and age we also have indicators for special
educational need, 77% of our sample not requiring any additional help, with 3% requiring
a statement of special need. Also presented are the methods of travel to school, 40% walk
to school. Table 1 also presents the contact availability measures.
Table 2 presents a summary of each of the ethnic language groups. The largest ethnic
group in our sample is Pakistani; the majority do not speak English at home, and also
have slightly above the sample average of free meals. Most striking is the African group.
Whereas for the English-speaking Africans the free school meal split is similar to the overall
sample mean, for the African non English-speaking group the free school meal eligibility
rates are very high at around 50%. The Chinese and Indian groups are the smallest welfare
recipients. Typically those who do not speak English have higher welfare use than those
who do. This can be seen in the bottom panel, there is a 7 percentage point difference in
our sample between non English-speaking groups and English-speaking groups. This can
be seen within the ethnicities also, with only the Romany group having higher free school
meal eligibility rates for the English-speaking group.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Identification Issues
Dealing with the identification issues associated with estimating peer effects involves taking
into consideration the reflection problem, Manski (1993), Moffitt (2001), Brock and Durlauf
(2001). It is difficult to disentangle the actions of the individual from the actions of the
peer group. An association between the behaviour of a pupil and pupils in their peer group
can be categorised into three main effects. The first classification is called the correlated
effect, in which individuals have similar behaviour because they face the same constraints,
or because of their characteristics they self-select into a peer group. For example, a school
could be reluctant to hand out forms to claim the benefit, or support staff are not so aware
of how to claim, therefore few people in that school apply. On the other hand schools
with many impoverished pupils have a greater incentive to get pupils claiming as they have
to provide a certain number of meals. Additionally, having a common income level is a
further example of a correlated effect. The next classification of effect is an exogenous or
14To simplify the notation, here onwards I will to the relative FSM measure just as the mean FSM t.
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contextual effect, in which the behaviour varies according to the exogenous characteristics
that define membership of that group. For example, for cultural or religious reasons some
of the meals provided may not be suitable for their group, so this reduces take up.15 The
perception that the meals do not take into account particular dietary requirements, and
failure by the school to take this into account could result in not registering for the meal as
the parents know the children will not eat it or as it does not conform to their particular
needs.
The final classification is an endogenous effect, where the behaviour of an individual
is causally influenced by the behaviour of the other members of the peer group, such that
an individual decides to register for the free school meal because of the behaviour of their
peers. I focus on two categories. Information is one type of endogenous effect, or indeed
lack of information. There are different ways this could manifest. First, by informing
others about the existence of the programme that free school meals exist; this could be
relevant for newcomers to the country who are not aware of the welfare programmes that
are available. Getting information about own eligibility or the eligibility criteria in general
and also how to apply are all potential ways information can be part of an endogenous
effect. For example, if a member of the peer’s group informs their peers of the criteria and
where to go for the forms, these would be examples of information sharing. Seeing those
who claim the meal enjoy it and that they do not suffer negative social pressure, such as
bullying, could also be an informational way through which conformity occurs. The second
type of endogenous effect is stigma. This could prevent some people from adopting the
free school meals, due to the visible nature of the child having to claim such a benefit
on a daily basis. This is probably the most commonly cited reason for not claiming free
school meals.16 However, being surrounded by many of those also claiming may reduce the
negative pressure of stigma as everybody else is engaging in similar behaviour therefore
this reduces the embarrassment of receiving social assistance.
15Equality impact assessments require the evaluating of any policies or services (including school
meals) and the impact that may have on people with respect to disability, gender and racial equal-
ity. For more detail on equality impact assessments: (http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/impact-
assessments/equality-impact-assessments/ This suggests that schools should legally take into account
any changes to the meals in relation to ethnicity reducing any potential contextual effect. An ex-
ample of an equality impact assessment with an example related to school meals can be found here:
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/core.nsf/a/einaguidance7
16Two-fifths of parents identified embarrassment as a reason for not claiming free school meals (Storey
and Chamberlain (2001).
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4.2 Estimation
The baseline estimates are from the following:
FSMislt = β(CAslt ∗ FSM lt) + δCAslt +Xislt +Gslt + Zst + Vlt + islt (1)
where FSM is binary and equal to 1 indicating participation,17 or enrolment, in the
Free School Meal programme, and the subscripts i, s, l, t denote the individual, school
(year group or area), ethnic language group, and time. CA as defined before is the Contact
Availability measure.
I include a set of school, year group, or area, by year fixed effects Zst and a set of
ethnic language group by year fixed effects ,Vlt. Therefore any effects that I find will not
be due to school (or output area) differences. This allows me to call the estimates I find
peer as opposed to school or neighbourhood effects. In order for this to hold, we assume
that unobserved school (output area) variables do not differ according to ethnic language
group. The above equation (1) accounts for a number of omitted variables biases. The
previously mentioned location fixed effects (school or area) eliminate any fixed differences
in free school meal provision, including quality of the meal. Including ethnic language
by year fixed effects accounts for any cultural differences in relation to the meals and to
welfare use in general. CAslt is included directly as a control, this controls for reasons why
individuals choose to live in ethnic enclaves. The second part of the main peer measure
interaction, FSM lt, subsumed into the ethnic language by year fixed effects.
One potential problem with the above specification could be differential selection. There
may be additional omitted individual characteristics that are correlated with CAslt∗FSM lt
and hence may bias the estimates upwards. Including CAslt in the model controls for self-
selection that is fixed across ethnic language groups. However, self-selection into enclaves
could differ according to different ethnic language groups and by the degree of free school
meal enrolment. This could lead to finding peer effects where there are none. I explain
this consequence using two hypothetical individuals. One individual who is from a high
free school meal using group decides to live away from their own ethnic group and, maybe
to signal success or due to differential cultural attitudes to welfare, decides not to enrol. A
second individual from a low free school meal using group who lives away from their ethnic
contacts may have a more relaxed attitude to welfare use, compared to their own group,
and therefore enrols in the programme. Both of these cases would make it more likely to
find effects that would not be explained by a social interactions.
To deal with differential selection I first adopt an instrumental variable approach. I
demonstrate this approach using an area level example. As in Dustmann et al (2011)
17Participation means that the benefit has been applied for and eligibility has been satisfied
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and Bertrand et al (2000) I exploit the geographic hierarchy of the contact availability
measures. For example, in the LSOA18 level regressions, contact availability at the MSOA
and the interaction of the MSOA contact availability with mean free school meal use of
the ethnic language group are used as instruments for contact availability at the (smaller)
LSOA and the interaction of the LSOA contact availability with mean free school meal
use of the ethnic language group. I also repeat this exercise using the LEA level measures
instead of the MSOA. The identification of the IV rests on the assumption that selection
at the MOSA level is greater than at the LSOA level. This makes sense intuitively as
people may be forced to live in certain areas for work reasons. However, within that larger
region they then select the local neighbourhood they are going to live in. Alternatively,
it is easier to move within a MSOA (or LEA) than between MSOAs because the costs of
doing so are that much higher. Furthermore, there is correlation between LSOA and its
corresponding MSOA in terms of the share of ethnic language groups, but if differential
selection is the main driver of the estimates then OLS will overestimate the effect. Hence
our IV estimates are only biased due to between MSOA selection whereas OLS may be
biased due to both between and within, comparing the two estimates facilitates to check
the degree of selection.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Estimates
Table 3 presents results from the estimation of equation (1), in each case standard errors
are clustered at the school or area level, depending on the level of estimation. Panel A
presents the results at the school and year group level. Each regression controls for school
by year fixed effects and ethnic language by year fixed effects, also included as controls
are age, age squared, month of birth, dummies for different levels of special educational
need, and mode of travel to school. Although not reported in the tables, each of the special
educational need variables are positive and significant as we may expect, relative to no
special need. There is a negative coefficient for those who travel to school by car relative
to other forms of transport. Those who get the bus or walk to school are more likely to
have registered their free school meal eligibility.
In each of the columns we find a positive and highly significant coefficient on the peer
group measure, the interaction of contact availability and mean of free school meal eligibility
of the ethnic language group. Therefore the probability to register for free school meals
18Recall that the smallest areas I have available in my data are the LSOAs. MSOAs are larger than
LSOAs and LEAs are the largest.
12
increases with the number of contacts in the pupil’s school, if the mean of free school meal
eligibility of that group is high. Column 1 in panel A presents estimates for the peer group
being defined at the school level. The coefficient of 0.106 is positive and significant but is
not simple to interpret. The intuition behind the interpretation is to examine the effect
of a hypothetical ‘welfare shock’ and examine the effect of that shock with the presence of
peers and without.
To do this, following Bertrand et al (2000), I assume there is this exogenous policy
shock, represented by α in equation (2):
FSMislt = α + β(CAslt ∗ FSM lt) + δCAslt +Xislt +Gslt + Zst + Vlt + islt (2)
A 1 percentage point increase in α would exogenously increase free school meal enrol-
ment, in the absence of any peer effect, by 1 percentage point. This increase in α has
a direct effect through this upward shift of 1 percentage point but also and an indirect
feedback effect through the peer group, specifically through FSM lt. In order to find the
complete effect I take the mean of both sides of equation (2) with respect to the ethnic
language group, l, and differentiate with respect to alpha. This is represented by:
dFSM l
dα
= 1 + CAl ∗ βFSM l
dα
(3)
This policy shock α results in an 1/(1 − βCAlt) effect. Where CAlt is the weighted
average over all ethnic language groups, I obtain the effect of the peer group by subtracting
the direct effect (1 percentage point) such that the welfare shock is increased by 1/(1 −
βCAlt) − 1 due to the presence of peers. These effects are shown in the bottom row of
the panels. Taking the school level results in column 1 as an example, a policy shock that
would have resulted in a 1 percentage point increase in free school meal eligibility in the
absence of peers would be 22% higher in the presence of peers.
In columns 2, 3, and 5 the peer group measures are instrumented with the peer group
measure and the contact availability at the larger geographical regions, the MSOA and
Local Educational Authority. This is to take account of, and test for, the previously
mentioned differential selection. For example, examining the area level results in panel
B, if there is differential selection into areas then OLS estimates will be biased upwards
due to selection from both within and between LSOAs, however the IV estimates would
only be biased due to selection between LSOAs. This is the test used by Evans et al
(1992) examining peer effects in teen pregnancy and school dropout rates. It is also used
by Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005). The OLS and IV estimates do not point to
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differential selection. In panel B, columns 2, 3, and 5, the IV estimates are larger than the
OLS results suggesting that the bias due to the self-selection is negative. Indeed comparing
the IV and OLS estimates suggests that OLS understate the effect of peers. The first stage
results are presented in table A1.
Before moving to further results, one concern could be that what are being estimated
are correlations of poverty. First, including area or school by year level fixed effects should
account for this problem, and that as such our estimates can be interpreted as a peer
rather than neighbourhood effect. Second, although there is an obvious poverty aspect to
free school meals, and indeed it is typically used as a proxy for poverty when a better one
is not necessarily available, Hobbs and Vignoles (2007) show that free school meal status
is an imperfect proxy for low income or unemployment, and that there is significant bias
in using free school meals status as opposed to actual socioeconomic status.
Table 4 presents the peer group effect for the combined PLASC and LYSPE data. The
purpose of this exercise is to first act as a robustness check on the baseline estimates.
Second, it allows me to control for a range of family background indicators that are not
available in the PLASC data. I focus only on the school level analysis and estimate the same
equation for the PLASC data. The first column includes only the peer group and contact
availability measure. The effect is similar to that in the baseline PLASC results. The
second column adds in controls for other benefits that result in qualification of free school
meals (as spelled out in section 3), a dummy for income greater than £15,500, and benefits
that do not qualify for free school meal enrolment. These variables have the expected signs:
having an income above the threshold reduces the probability of registering FSM eligibility,
if the parent claims job seekers allowance, pension credit, or income support then there is a
positive association with claiming free school meals. The coefficient on claiming tax credits
is positive but insignificant in the second column, for subsequent columns this reverses
but remains insignificant. The inclusion of these sets of controls increases the peer group
coefficient.
Column 3 includes variables related to a conditional cash transfer related to the educa-
tion programme, the educational maintenance allowance (EMA). Being aware of the scheme
has no effect; however there is a positive effect of applying, or going to apply for EMA.
Column 4 additionally includes three family status variables. Lone parents are more likely
to register their eligibility, whereas this is negative for married parents. Having the internet
at home could potentially be positive or negative; there is an income effect of having the
internet which would reduce the probability of registering. However, the internet could po-
tentially facilitate registration or gathering information about the eligibility criteria. The
income effect appears to dominate. Also worth noting is that the inclusion of these controls
results in a drop of the main peer group effect. Column 5 includes controls for bullying
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as reported by the parents; there is a negative effect, albeit imprecisely measured of being
threatened with violence. Column 5 also includes, unreported, ten dummies for the age of
the mother and six education dummies for the mother. Finally, column 6 estimates the
same instrumental variable strategy as in the baseline estimation. Similarly I find that the
IV estimates are larger than the OLS, suggesting that there is not a problem of differential
selection and the OLS estimates may be under-estimating the actual effect. With the com-
bined PLASC/LSYPE data it is possible to condition directly on the eligibility criteria. I
examine this in more detail in the appendix section A1.
5.2 Robustness & Alternative Explanations
Sample Selection & Heterogeneous Effects
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, the sample selections act as robustness checks
to make sure it is not one group or another that is solely driving the effect. Second, they
may indicate important heterogeneity of the impact.
Table 5 presents estimates for different samples. In the first panel I split the sample
by various ages, below aged 8 and below aged 11 in order to capture effects at primary
school, and above aged 11 and aged 14 to capture different effects at secondary school.
The decision to register for free school meals would primarily be made by the parent for
the younger children and as they become older the decision is more likely to be a joint
one. The estimates are all broadly similar to the baseline results. The peer effect for the
oldest children aged fifteen and above is only slightly smaller than for the other ages. These
suggest that peers have an impact over the entire distribution of ages.
Second, I again restrict the sample by age and also whether or not English is spoken as
a first language. The effects here are stronger, suggesting that the peer effect is greater for
those who do not speak English as a first language, this is tested in the next section. The
results in this panel confirm the previous findings that the effects are present across the age
spectrum, if only slightly weaker for the older children. The larger effects, albeit marginal,
for the younger children, and also those non English speaking, could suggest a playground
effect. Where parents of younger children collect their children in the playground they are
then more likely to interact with those of the same ethnic language group.
Third, table 2 showed that there is a wide variety of ethnicities present in the sample,
and although one is not vastly bigger than the others, we may be concerned that one
of these groups may be driving our results. Therefore the third panel excludes in turn
Pakistani, African, and Bangladeshi groups. Excluding the African ethnic group from the
estimation has the most dramatic effect, the coefficient falls by around 40% in the school
regression, and 35% in the area regressions. They do however remain highly significant and
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positive.
Next, I exclude groups with high free school meal eligibility, and again find positive
and significant results across the different regressions. The results from Africans who do
not speak English as a first language are almost the same as to those in panel 3, where we
exclude the whole African group, suggesting that it is this group that is driving that fall
in the coefficient. When other high free school meal eligible groups are excluded from the
estimation, the results are similar.
Bilingual Staff & Language Help
An alternative explanation for finding a positive effect could be that the presence of a
significant proportion of ethnic minority students (or their parents) who may or may not
have English as a first language, may motivate the school to hire bilingual staff, or may
encourage the local authority to provide application material in alternative languages, or
offer help such as translation services. These actions by the school or local authority would
also predict a positive effect. To that end I estimate the peer effect for different samples of
schools. First, the latest school census contains information about the staff at the school.
Therefore I have information on whether the school employs any full time equivalent bilin-
gual minority ethnic support staff, and I use this information to see whether the effect
is through this bureaucratic channel (Bertrand et al (2000)) by comparing schools with
and without bilingual support staff. Second, I have asked a number of local authorities19
whether they provide translation services, or provide the free school meal application forms
in different languages. By using this information I compare the peer effect in both cases
and see whether the effect is driven through this channel.
Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. Panel A examines the impact of the pres-
ence of a bilingual ethnic minority member of staff. Column 1 presents the baseline estimate
for the sample available. Column 2 presents the peer measure for schools with a bilingual
staff member and column 3 for those without. The final column represents the p-value of
a test for no difference. For both groups we find positive and significant effects, although
the difference between them is statistically significant. However, for those schools with a
bilingual member of staff the effect is present and still large, therefore, purely this channel
cannot be driving the result that I find. Panels B and C examine providing support at
the local authority level. Panel B splits the sample by local authorities who provide the
application forms in different languages and those that do not; there is not a statistically
19Local authorities were specifically asked: ‘Do you provide any forms or help for those claiming free
school meals whose first language is not English. If so, when was this first implemented?’ Virtually no
local authority was able to provide info on when they first offered translated forms or translation services,
therefore I use the latest year available of the PLASC data 2009 to make sure that it is close as possible
to the data collected about the local authorities.
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significant difference between these two groups of local authorities. Panel C splits by local
authorities who said they offer additional help. The difference is significant however, as
with the bilingual staff, there is still a positive and significant effect, therefore the local
authorities’ action cannot fully explain the effect I find.
English Proficiency
Table 7 examines how the peer effect differs according to how proficient one is at English.
Firstly, I examine the impact on whether the pupil has stated that their first language is
one other than English. The peer effect for this group is much larger, this is evidence that
information is part of the peer effect. Those who speak a language other than English
are probably more reliant on others, who share that language, for information about the
relevant systems for claiming.
In panels B and C I examine how the actual proficiency of English has an impact on
the strength of the peer effect. Proficiency is measured by the level achieved in government
set tests at ages 11 (Key Stage 2) and 14 (Key Stage 3).20 In addition to the peer group
measure, panel 2 includes two interactions, one interacting the peer group with an indicator
for achieving level 4 and above and one for level 5 and above, in order to test the impact of
English proficiency. As the English level of the student improves the strength of the peer
group is diminished. This also holds for the older children, using the key stage 3 measures
in panel 4. The peer effect still remains for those who score well on the tests, but is weaker
as the level improves.
Panels D and E examine how the English proficiency of contacts has an impact on the
peer effect. As Bertrand et al (2000) mention, there are two opposite drivers of this effect.
Increased English proficiency could imply that those contacts have more information about
the system, and can help in navigating the bureaucracy of benefits, implying a positive
effect. Conversely, areas with high English proficiency may be more attached to the labour
market and less reliant on benefits so know less about the system. This second effect sug-
gests a negative impact of English proficiency of the peer group. The interacted terms of
the peer group and the percentage in the school or area with level 4 and 5 and above is
negative, most strongly for the higher level 5 at key stage 2. The key stage 3 results tell a
similar story, the effect is weaker in areas with higher percentages of those achieving level
5 and 6.
Additional Results and Robustness Checks
In the appendix I examine a range of different specifications, including using ex-ante peer
characteristics (see table A3), I estimate logit, probit and use different definitions of peers
20Level 4 is the expected level set by the government for Key Stage 2 and level 5 for Key Stage 3.
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in table A4. Section A5 examines potential non-linearities and section A6 presents a ro-
bustness analyisis with a focus on the regional variation.
5.3 Understanding the Peer Effect
This section tries to uncover the nature of the peer effect in more detail. The question I ask
in this section is: How does the peer effect vary in the presence (or absence) of stigma or
information? Previous sections have established the presence of a peer effect in free school
meal enrolment, and also examined how the effect differs for different groups. In particular
the effect is greater for those whose first language is not English. Next I try to uncover the
nature of the peer effect in a more direct way. There are two main components I examine
here; the first is related to stigma (a psychological cost associated with the welfare benefit),
and in the second I test for information.
In attempting to measure β it is important to assess what β is actually measuring. So
far this has been referred to as a peer effect, but what does that encompass? β can be
broken down into three component parts: β∗ = βi+βs+βz where βi measures the positive
element of the peer effect. For example, this could be by providing information about the
eligibility criteria. βs measures the negative peer effect related to stigma or negative social
pressure, and βz some other unknown elements that could be either positive or negative.
The task in this section goes beyond finding a peer effect and examines a more general
question as to how to separate out the main effects of information and stigma. I do this
by comparing the peer effect in two different states, when stigma (information) is present
and when stigma (information) is absent. From the baseline estimate, at the school level,
β̂ = 0.1 . Then in that case we know that β̂ = βi + βs + βz = 0.1, the problem is that we
only know the combination of these three effects. One way around this would be to find
a situation where we can set either βi or βs to 0, then estimate what the peer effect is in
this case and compare the effects of a welfare shock in either case to see how each has a
different effect in different environments.
Stigma Test
In order to do this I use a technological innovation that has been increasingly introduced
into schools over the last few years, cashless catering systems. These replace the use of cash
in the dining hall with some other payment method. There are a number of different types
of cashless catering systems. These include swipe and smart cards21, pin numbers, touch
screen with student pictures displayed on screen, and biometric systems22, where the pupils
21Cash can be put on them by the parents and this would be automatic for those claiming free school
meals.
22The biometric systems are less popular than other methods, this is due to ethical issues surrounding
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are identified using their finger print. I do not distinguish between the different systems in
the analysis, however, they all have the key feature of introducing anonymity for those who
claim free school meals and as such remove the visible stigma associated with taking them.
It is important to note that these systems would not necessarily remove the internal stigma
associated with claiming benefits but would remove the visible stigma and remove the fear
of bullying that could result in being known to be on free school meals. Therefore the
key question is what happens to the peer effect when we remove visible stigma. Typically,
before the introduction of cashless systems those eligible for free school meals would have
been given a token in order to claim their meal, this would have made them very visible to
the other pupils.
Therefore we are able to set βs = 0 by using a subset of the schools and local authorities
who have adopted this system. Data was collected, by a phone interview, from 406 sec-
ondary schools, a sample of around 10% of the total schools, in 31 local authorities23. The
focus is on secondary schools, primarily because the cashless catering systems are far more
likely to be used in secondary schools, given the cost involved and the gains in economies
of scale that can be achieved are greater in a secondary school relative to primary. Second,
it could be assumed that there is greater visible stigma in secondary schools, as children
get older they are more likely to be aware of these issues. Finally, a practical reason is
that one secondary school covers around 1000-1500 pupils compared to 100-300 pupils in a
primary school.
The schools were asked whether they have introduced a cashless catering system. If the
answer was positive, then a further question was asked enquiring when this was introduced.
Figure 3 presents the coverage of cashless catering in schools in the sample. Coverage is
measured in two ways, first by the number of pupils affected by the introduction of cashless
system, and second by the number of schools. Around 10% of those contacted did not give
a sufficient answer; of those for which it could be established whether or not they have a
cashless system and in which year, around 60% of the schools contacted either operate some
form of cashless system, 14.5% of schools had a cashless system before the analysis period
(pre-2006), and 15.7% had introduced a system in 2010, 2011, or were planning to in the
next academic year (2011/2012) beginning in September 2011. To determine whether this
is a representative sample, I compare my sample to two other surveys of cashless catering
systems, the School Food Trust (2009) surveyed 98 secondary schools and found 53% have
the collection of pupils’ fingerprints.
23The local authorities that were contacted were: Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Barnsley, Bath and
North Somerset, Bedford, Bexley, Birmingham, Bradford, Bury, Derby, Ealing, Enfield, Hartlepool, Lam-
beth, Leicester, Newham, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire, Plymouth, Poole, Portsmouth, Richmond upon
Thames, Southampton, Southend, Staffordshire, Tower Hamlets, Trafford, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth,
Warrington, Warwickshire.
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a cashless system, with 16.3% considering introducing a system in the near future. Nelson
et al. (2010) in a survey conducted in 2009/2010 found around 45% of schools with catering
in local authority control have a cashless system, compared to 20% not in local authority
control. Therefore, although the two surveys and this current study ask slightly different
questions regarding the use of cashless systems, the results of the survey in the current
study seem reasonable and not out of line with other surveys, although my sample has a
slightly higher percentage this is perhaps not too surprising given my survey was conducted
later.
The School Food Trust (2009) and Nelson et al (2010) also directly asked reasons
why the systems were introduced. Both surveys cite removal of stigma related to the
differentiation of free school meals students as the primary reason for the introduction of
cashless system. The School Food Trust (2009) cites the removal of stigma as the main
reason for 77% of the schools that are considering using a cashless system. What these
surveys show is that the primary reason for the introduction of these systems is the removal
of stigma. It is important to know why these are not introduced. The primary reason given
is cost. These systems are quite costly, between £6000-25,000 depending upon the system
and the size of the school, and 70% of those surveyed cited budget constraints as the main
reason for not introducing the system. Therefore, there may be differences between the
schools that adopt the system and those that do not, although as we have seen from the
surveys this is mainly due to the budgets of the schools. As there may be differences
in unobservable characteristics between the schools which adopt this technology, we also
restrict the estimation to those which have cashless systems and identify the effect through
the variation in timing of the changes.
To determine the peer effect when stigma is removed we estimate the following:
FSMislt = α + β1CAslt*FSM lt + β2CAslt*FSM lt*Post Cashlessslt +
+β3Post Cashlessslt + δCAslt +Xislt +Gslt + Zst + Vlt + islt
(4)
This is the same equation as estimated in the previous sections; however I include the
interaction of the peer group with a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for the year after
the introduction of the cashless catering system. Therefore when Post Cashless = 1, the
assumption made is that there is no stigma such that βs = 0, hence β = β
i + βz = β1 + β2.
When Post Cashless = 0 then β = βi + βz + βs = β1 so we can compare the peer effect
when stigma is present and when it is absent. Given information and stigma come through
social interaction, I focus on how the peer effect changes with the introduction of a cashless
system. Note that the Post Cashlessslt variable is subsumed by the school by year fixed
effects.
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Table 11 presents the results of this estimation using the PLASC data from 2006 to 2009.
Column 1 presents the peer group effect and the interaction with a post implementation
(‘post cashless’) model for all schools in our sample that were called without any controls.
Column 2 includes the controls from the baseline regressions, the coefficients remain similar.
The interaction term is positive, suggesting that the removal of stigma has a positive
differential impact on the peer effect, i.e. removing visible stigma increases the peer effect.
Alternatively, the results show that when a peer effect has stigma present it is lower than
when it has been removed.
To interpret the effects, the same thought experiment is carried out as in the interpre-
tation of the baseline results; hence I convert the effects into hypothetical welfare shocks,
and show the welfare shock with and without stigma. Hence from the coefficients from
column 2, we find a welfare shock is 15% higher when peers with stigma are present, how-
ever this increases to 29% in the absence of stigma, a 45% increase in the welfare shock.
In column 3 we restrict our sample only to those who have adopted the cashless system.
In this case identification comes from variation within only those schools with a cashless
system and hence these schools should be more comparable on fixed unobservable charac-
teristics that would predict adopting the cashless system. Here the removal of stigma has
a greater effect. Column 4 and 5 include the white British ethnic group, the overall size of
the welfare shocks decrease, however the presence of stigma has a larger effect reducing a
positive welfare shock by 64% and 84% for all schools and cashless schools.
Information Test
Table 12 tests for the role that information may play in the peer effect. Aizer and Cur-
rie (2004), in examining the use of pre-natal medical care, assume that for second births
mothers should know more about publicly funded pre-natal care programmes than those
who are having their first birth. Therefore, they expect that if the role of the peer group
is to pass on information, then for this group of second mothers the peer effect should be
smaller. This section performs a similar test. The peer group is examined in a situation
where the information element is less important for certain groups. Previously I examined
groups where information from the peers is potentially less important, such as those who
have high English Test scores. The results of this current test are shown in column 1 and
2, at the school and LSOA level. The assumption we make is that there should be no
information to be gained for those who have claimed in either of the previous two years.
The sample is restricted to 2009, therefore a previous claimant is defined as someone who
claimed in either 2008 and/or 2007.
The claim form for free school meals, as described, showed that the free school meals had
to be applied for each year, and also that the criteria changes from year to year, therefore,
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there are changes to the information that one needs in order to register eligibility. Given
the changes that occur to the criteria over time, the previous group’s network effect may
still have some residual information if we consider a longer timeframe. We estimate the
following equation:
FSMislt = α + β1CAslt*FSM lt + β2CAslt*FSM lt*Previous FSMislt +
+β3Previous FSMislt + δCAslt +Xislt +Gslt + Zst + Vlt + islt
(5)
Analogous to equation (2) this is the same equation as estimated in the baseline es-
timates with an added interaction of the peer group, a dummy variable that takes a
value 1 if the pupil has claimed free school meals in the previous two years. Therefore
when Previous FSM = 1, the assumption we make is that there is no information for this
group such that βi = 0, hence β
∗ = βs + βz = β1 + β2. When Previous FSM = 0 then
β∗ = βi + βs + βz = β1 so we can compare the peer effect when information is present
and when it is absent. Column 1 presents baseline estimates for 2009. Column 2 and 3
define previous claimant as someone who claimed in 2007, column 4 and 5 as someone who
claimed in 2008, and column 6 and 7 as someone who claimed in 2007 or 2008. The esti-
mates are significantly lower for previous claimants, therefore suggesting that information
is an important component of the peer effect, this is in contrast to Aizer and Currie (2004)
who do not find that information plays a role, but similar to Figlio et al. (2011) who in a
less stable informational environment find information is important. Examining column 6
and 7, these results show when a welfare shock, defined previously, increases by 4% when
the peer effect contains no (or little) information, therefore not having information as part
of the peer measure reduces the impact by 36%.
Heterogeneity of Stigma and Information
Finally, I examine how stigma and information vary according to both education and
income. As the PLASC data does not have family background measures we utilise neigh-
bourhood level information on education and income deprivation24. In table 10 I split the
sample into 4 quartiles and re-estimate the tests carried out in column 3 of table 8 for each
of those quartiles, I use the non-white sample and restrict to the cashless sample. The
24Deprivation measures come from the Office of National Statistics, Index of Multiple Deprivation Index.
The two domains used here are defined as the following: Employment Deprivation - defined as involuntary
exclusion of the working age population from work, and includes elements of the ’hidden unemployed’ such
as those out of work due to illness and disability. Education, Skills and Training Deprivation - the extent
of deprivation in education, skills and training in an area. The indicators grouped into two sub-domains:
one relating to children and young people and one relating to adult skills. These two sub-domains are
designed to reflect the ‘flow’ and ‘stock’ of educational disadvantage within an area. For more information
on indices of deprivation see http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/research/indicesdeprivation/
http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/research/indicesdeprivation/
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pattern across the different deprivation measures is similar with the lowest welfare shocks
for the most deprived. These results suggest that for those who are potentially on the
margins of applying, stigma from their peers plays an important role in preventing take up,
however for the least well off in society, this visible stigma is less important, potentially as
the benefit of the welfare is that much greater.
Table 11 performs a similar exercise and replicates the two information tests for the
quartiles of employment and education. These results are based on the most restrictive
definition of previous claimant, i.e. having claimed in either 2008 or 2007. Interestingly,
the results are the opposite of the stigma estimates. Along with education deprivation,
information plays no part in the peer effects for the least deprived, i.e. for the best educated.
This backs up the previous section that examined the test scores in language skill, for these
groups information should be less important as they rely less on their peers or networks for
information. Alternatively, it could be that the better educated are able to get information
from other sources more easily. The pattern is also similar across income deprivation, with
lack of information having the greatest impact for the most deprived.
These results suggest not only that both stigma and information have an impact on the
magnitude of the peer effect, but that there is important heterogeneity in this impact which
could imply important policy differences, targeting different policies at different parts of
the population.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of peer effects in the UK’s largest food welfare programme.
To examine this issue I use a large administrative data set from the UK covering all school
children. Defining the peer group as the interaction of quality and quantity as proposed by
Bertrand et al (2000), it is found that a pupil is more likely to enrol for free school meals
when surrounded by more of their peers who share a common ethnicity and language, if
that ethnic language group is a high free school meal using group at the national level.
These effects are robust to a range of specifications and the controlling for unobserved
characteristics using school/small area level by year fixed effects. The magnitude of the
effect is such that the presence of peers increases a welfare shock by around 20-30%. These
results suggest that policies aimed at expanding (or contracting) enrolment will have a
greater marginal impact for those living in enclaves.
In addition the larger contribution of this paper is to be able to examine the nature of the
peer effect. It is widely thought that peers provide information about welfare programmes
and that stigma, such as negative social pressure or from peers may prevent take up. I
propose a range of tests to gauge the extent to which each of these elements has an impact.
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I examine how the peer effect differs when stigma and information is present and when
it is not. Recently, more and more schools have adopted a technological innovation that
removes the stigma associated with free school meals; cashless catering systems remove
the identification of those claiming. By collecting data from over 400 secondary schools I
examine the impact of these systems on the peer effect. I find that stigma dampens welfare
shocks by around 40-60%. I perform a similar test for information, assuming that the peer
group should not provide information to those who have previously claimed. This test also
shows that information is important. This confirms the findings that the peer effect is
smaller for those with high English test scores.
Finally, I examine how the effect of stigma and information varies according to income
and education. For the most deprived areas in society stigma is a less, and information is
a more, important component of the peer effect. This has important policy implications
suggesting that campaigns aimed at improving information will have a greater marginal
effect in more deprived areas. In contrast, efforts to remove the visible element of stigma
have a greater marginal impact in the better off areas.
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Figure 1: LSOA & MSOA Essex Map of Free School Meal Eligibility (Essex)
source: Based on 2008 PLASC data
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Figure 2: Local Education Authority Map of Free School Meal Eligibility percentage in
each
source: Based on 2008 PLASC data
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Figure 3: Cashless Catering Coverage: Children and Schools
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
PLASC Sample LSYPE Sample
mean sd mean sd
Free School Meal Eligible 0.260 0.439 0.241 0.428
Contact Availability and Peer Groups
Year Group Contact Availability 13.48 51.60 12.04 15.73
Ln Year Group Contact Availability 1.920 1.155 1.795 1.248
Year Group Peer Group 0.216 0.310 0.189 0.327
School Contact Availability 10.39 30.03 10.36 14.39
Ln School Contact Availability 1.556 1.308 1.537 1.385
School Peer Group 0.185 0.300 0.170 0.323
LSOA Contact Availability 9.327 20.32 11.85 14.07
Ln LSOA Contact Availability 1.615 1.163 1.819 1.237
LSOA Peer Group 0.188 0.287 0.209 0.335
MSOA Contact Availability 7.411 10.05 9.966 12.73
Ln MSOA Contact Availability 1.318 1.281 1.561 1.342
MSOA Peer Group 0.161 0.274 0.184 0.325
Age 9.693 3.722 15.62 0.794
Male 0.509 0.500 0.469 0.499
Special Educational Need
School Action 0.138 0.345 0.0847 0.278
School Action Plus 0.0612 0.240 0.0281 0.165
Statement 0.0275 0.163 0.0204 0.141
Mode of Transport
Car 0.225 0.418
Bus 0.130 0.337
Walk 0.398 0.489
Train 0.00692 0.0829
Bullied
Called Names 0.0502 0.218
Excluded from Friends 0.0239 0.153
Hand over money 0.00285 0.0533
Threatened with violence 0.0176 0.131
Experienced violence 0.0177 0.132
Other Background Characteristics
Health of Main Parent Fairly or Very Good 0.784 0.412
Child Benefit 0.939 0.240
Guardian Allowence 0.00201 0.0448
Invalid Care Allowence 0.0219 0.146
Severe Disability Allowence 0.00736 0.0855
Disability Living Allowence 0.0800 0.271
Attendance Allowence 0.00569 0.0752
Income greater than 15,500 0.349 0.477
Disabled Mother 0.134 0.341
Disabled Father 0.122 0.327
Job Seekers Allowance 0.0196 0.139
Lone parent 0.216 0.411
Married Main Parent 0.726 0.446
Step Family 0.0382 0.192
Number of Siblings 2.070 1.483
Internet Access in the home 0.797 0.402
Main parent change to not working 0.0981 0.297
Income Source: pension 0.0385 0.192
Income Source: income support 0.202 0.402
Income Source: tax credits 0.419 0.493
Aware of EMA 0.630 0.483
Applied for EMA 0.107 0.309
Will apply for EMA 0.544 0.498
Number of observations 3,881,969 5975
Notes: Summary statistics based on baseline sample from table 3 column 1
for PLASC sample, and table 4 for LSYPE sample
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Table 3: Baseline I
Dependent Variable: Free School Meal Participation
Panel A: School Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CA Measure: School School School Year Year
Group Group
Estimation: OLS IV IV OLS IV
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.106*** 0.201*** 0.184*** 0.096*** 0.136***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
CAslt -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3881969 3858263 3878419 3881969 3816367
R-squared 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.045
Welfare Shock 21.9% 53.3% 46.8% 23.4% 35.6%
School x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Language x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument - MSOA LEA - School
Panel B: Area Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CA Measure: LSOA LSOA LSOA MSOA MSOA
Estimation OLS IV IV OLS IV
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.127*** 0.154*** 0.228*** 0.122*** 0.187***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
CAslt -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,861,867 3,858,355 3,858,391 3,861,831 3,861,792
R-squared 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.056 0.056
Welfare Shock 26.6% 33.1% 64.2% 19.4% 32.4%
School x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Language x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument - MSOA LEA - LEA
notes:
a) Standard errors clustered at the level of the contact availability measure in parenthesis. Significance level
denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
b) Additional controls include: age, age squared, month of birth, special educational need dummies, mode of
transport dummies
c) Ethnic Language by year fixed effects are represented by 96 dummies
d) The sample comprises of the PLASC data from 2007-2009, exluded ethnic groups include white british,
other white, excluded and unknown ethnicities. Those without a school or area code are also excluded from
the sample.
e) CA is an abbreviation for Contact Availability as defined in the text.
f) Calculation for the response to a hypothetical welfare shock as defined in the text.
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Table 5: Robustness Checks: Sample Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yr Group School LSOA MSOA
Panel A: Age Samples
Age≥ 15 0.0815*** 0.101*** 0.119*** 0.117***
(0.00704) (0.0101) (0.00756) (0.00662)
Age≥ 12 0.0988*** 0.107*** 0.133*** 0.128***
(0.00448) (0.00967) (0.00636) (0.00636)
Age≤ 10 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.122*** 0.120***
(0.00367) (0.00672) (0.00570) (0.00609)
Age≤ 7 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.117*** 0.118***
(0.00491) (0.00718) (0.00612) (0.00614)
Panel B: Age and Language Samples
Age≥ 15 & English Not 1st Language 0.109*** 0.129*** 0.111*** 0.111***
(0.00887) (0.0122) (0.0103) (0.00831)
Age≥ 12 & English Not 1st Language 0.131*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.135***
(0.00555) (0.0112) (0.00808) (0.00735)
Age≤ 10 & English Not 1st Language 0.138*** 0.149*** 0.140*** 0.140***
(0.00442) (0.00773) (0.00753) (0.00645)
Age≤ 7 & English Not 1st Language 0.139*** 0.145*** 0.133*** 0.136***
(0.00590) (0.00838) (0.00726) (0.00665)
Panel C: Excluded Ethnic Groups
Pakistani 0.103*** 0.110*** 0.137*** 0.128***
(0.00272) (0.00584) (0.00529) (0.00607)
African 0.0646*** 0.0654*** 0.0935*** 0.0882***
(0.00286) (0.00493) (0.00511) (0.00454)
Bangladeshi 0.105*** 0.113*** 0.333*** 0.127***
(0.00278) (0.00597) (0.00105) (0.00644)
Panel D: Excluded High FSM Groups
Pakistani & English not 1st Language 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.136*** 0.127***
(0.00268) (0.00364) (0.00341) (0.00466)
African & English not 1st Language 0.0680*** 0.0682*** 0.102*** 0.0951***
(0.00285) (0.00329) (0.00344) (0.00375)
Bangladeshi & English not 1st Language 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.124***
(0.00258) (0.00550) (0.00508) (0.00585)
notes:
a) Standard errors clustered at the level of the contact availability measure in parenthesis. Significance level
denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
b) Additional controls include: age, age squared, month of birth, special educational need dummies, mode of
transport dummies. Ethnic Language by year fixed effects are represented by 96 dummies c) Each cell is a
separate regression, the coefficient is the interaction term CAslt ∗ FSM lt estimated by OLS.
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Table 6: Bilingual Staff and Language Help
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS P-value
Panel A: School Bilingual Help
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.001
(0.006) (0.015) (0.007)
Bilingual Staff - Yes No -
Observations 1,303,272 290,544 1,012,728 1,303,272
R-squared 0.049 0.057 0.047 0.049
Number of Schools 19,177 1,445 17,732 19,177
Panel B: Local Authority Language Forms
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.128*** 0.809
(0.008) (0.021) (0.009)
Language Forms - Yes No -
Observations 535,358 58,811 476,547 535,358
R-squared 0.048 0.068 0.047 0.048
Panel C: Local Authority Language Help
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.156*** 0.071*** 0.000
(0.011) (0.016)
Language Help - Yes No -
Observations 388,178 147,180 535,358
R-squared 0.050 0.048 0.049
Area by year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Language by year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
notes:
a) Standard errors clustered in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each cell is
a separate regression.
b) Data is from Pupil Level School Census 2009, controls as in table 3. Ethnic language
fixed effects represented by 32 dummies.
c) Contact availability measures all at the school level.
d) Column 1 in Panel A is the entire sample, column 2 restricts the sample for those
that have some bilingual ethnic minority members of staff, column 3 represents those
without, column 4 presents the p-value of a test of no difference between column 2
and 3. The columns for panel 2 are analagous to panel a with language forms replacing
bilingual staff. Column 1 in panel C is blank as this is based on the same sample for panel B.
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Table 7: English Proficiency
(1) (2) (3)
School LSOA MSOA
Panel A: English as a First Language
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.105*** 0.173*** 0.130***
(0.00793) (0.00745) (0.00765)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x English Not 1st Language 0.108*** 0.0754*** 0.0902***
(0.00814) (0.00692) (0.00827)
Panel B: Own Key Stage 2 English Results
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.189***
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0102)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x Eng Level 4 and Above -0.0479*** -0.0557*** -0.0326***
(0.00845) (0.00867) (0.00811)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x Eng Level 5 and Above -0.0733*** -0.0835*** -0.0766***
(0.00775) (0.00810) (0.00783)
Panel C: Own Key Stage 3 English Results
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.137*** 0.164*** 0.172***
(0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0134)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x Eng Level 5 and Above -0.0216* -0.0425*** -0.0468***
(0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0123)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x Eng Level 6 and Above -0.0512*** -0.0577*** -0.0520***
(0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0119)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x Eng Level 7 and Above -0.0590*** -0.0587*** -0.0616***
(0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0177)
Panel D: Mean Level of English
Of Contacts (Key Stage 2 English Results)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.196*** 0.201*** 0.251***
(0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0162)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x % KS2 Eng Level 4 and Above in Area/School -0.0189 -0.0550*** -0.102***
(0.0215) (0.0185) (0.0216)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x % KS2 Eng Level 5 and Above in Area/School -0.268*** -0.204*** -0.224***
(0.0269) (0.0217) (0.0262)
Panel E: Mean Level of English
Of Contacts (Key Stage 3 English Results)
Peer Group 0.221*** 0.199*** 0.238***
(0.0238) (0.0174) (0.0192)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x % KS3 Eng Level 5 and Above in Area/School -0.138*** -0.0975*** -0.130***
(0.0339) (0.0214) (0.0275)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x % KS3 Eng Level 6 and Above in Area/School -0.0904** -0.115*** -0.145***
(0.0401) (0.0252) (0.0331)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt x % KS3 Eng Level 7 and Above in Area/School -0.119** -0.0382 -0.0303
(0.0517) (0.0421) (0.0526)
notes:
a) Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In addition to the controls in the
notes to table 3, the relevant key stage level of the pupils is included (Panel B and C) or the proportion
who achieved the relevant key stage level of the pupil’s contact group (Panel D and E).
b) Data is the PLASC and National Pupil Database merged using all pupils who have a level for Key
Stage 2 and Key Stage 3 in 2006-2009
c) Each column in each panel represents a separate regression
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Table 10: Cashless Catering: Stigma, Education and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education Deprivation Least Most
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.0141 0.0578** 0.0826** 0.0952**
(0.0538) (0.0287) (0.0322) (0.0375)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt∗Post Cashless 0.0926 0.0718** 0.0691* 0.0265
(0.0571) (0.0326) (0.0408) (0.0430)
Observations 52,264 151,583 104,177 53,497
No Stigma β1 + β2 0.107 0.130 0.152 0.122
Welfare Shock - No Stigma 18% 32% 41% 31%
With Stigma β1 0.014 0.058 0.083 0.095
Welfare Shock - With Stigma 2% 12% 19% 23%
Stigma reduces a welfare shock by 89% 62% 54% 27%
Income Deprivation Least Most
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.0424 -0.0128 0.0419 0.106**
(0.0409) (0.0449) (0.0365) (0.0436)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt∗Post Cashless 0.0657 0.0907** 0.111*** 0.0316
(0.0495) (0.0441) (0.0347) (0.0464)
Observations 69,856 71,606 72,359 67,900
No Stigma β1 + β2 0.108 0.078 0.153 0.136
Welfare Shock - No Stigma 15% 15% 43% 43%
With Stigma β1 0.042 -0.012 0.042 0.106
Welfare Shock - With Stigma 5% -2% 9% 31%
Stigma reduces a welfare shock by 67% 84% 68% 18%
notes:
a) Standard errors clustered by school in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each
cell is a separate regression.
b) Data is from Pupil Level School Census 2007-2009, controls as in table 3. Data on school
operating (or not) a cashless system collected by the author.
c) Contact availability measures all at the school level.
d) Each column represents a quartile of the sample based on two indices of deprevation (as
described in the text) at the LSOA level.
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Table 11: Previous Claimants: Information, Education and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education Deprivation Least Most
Interaction Method
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.0602*** 0.0406*** 0.0420*** 0.0369***
(0.00534) (0.00635) (0.00636) (0.00771)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt*Previous FSM 0.000857 -0.0129 -0.0109 -0.0200**
(0.00984) (0.00823) (0.00843) (0.00934)
No Information β1 + β2 0.06 0.027 0.031 0.0168
Welfare Shock - No information 8.2% 4.4% 5.1% 2.9%
With Information β1 0.06 0.04 0.042 0.0368
Welfare Shock - With information 8.2% 6.6% 7% 6.5%
No Information decreases a welfare shock by 0% 33% 27% 56%
Income Deprivation Least Most
Interaction Method
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.0527*** 0.0586*** 0.0346*** 0.0370***
(0.00528) (0.00565) (0.00665) (0.00723)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt*Previous FSM 0.0212* -0.00167 -0.0161** -0.0313***
(0.0117) (0.00955) (0.00754) (0.00789)
No Information β1 + β2 0.074 0.057 0.019 0.0058
Welfare Shock - No information 7.8% 8.7% 3.3% 1.0%
With Information β1 0.053 0.059 0.035 0.037
Welfare Shock - With information 5.5% 9.0% 6.3% 6.9%
No Information decreases a welfare shock by -44% 3% 47% 85%
notes:
a) Standard errors clustered by school in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each cell is a separate
regression.
b) Data is from Pupil Level School Census 2007-2009, controls as in table 3.
c) Contact availability measures all at the school level.
d) Previous FSM (Claimant) defined as having claimed in either 2008 or 2007. e) Each column represents a
quartile of the sample based on two indices of deprevation (as described in the text) at the LSOA level.
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A Appendix
A.1 First-Stage Regressions
Table A1: First Stage Results for IV estimates from baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: School Level
CA Measure: School School Year Group
CA Measure of Intruments: MSOA LEA School
Instrumented Variable
F(2, 20488) F(2, 20504) F(2,118830)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 12015.24 7495.33 410000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAslt 10682.30 8294.18 330000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Area Level
CA Measure: LSOA LSOA MSOA
CA Measure of Intruments: MSOA LEA LEA
Instrumented Variable
F(2, 31606) F(2, 31609) F(2,6904)
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 58800.88 10407.01 10998.59
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAslt 72609.46 11682.33 9595.20
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
notes:
a) The test presented is the F test of excluded instruments. P-values in parenthesis.
b) Column 1 refers to the first stage of column 3 in table 3, column 2 refers to column 3
in table 3, and column 3 refers to column 5 in table 3
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A.2 Conditioning on Criteria
Table A2: LSYPE Data: Conditioned on Criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.118** 0.182** 0.116** 0.213** 0.114** 0.214**
(0.0575) (0.0866) (0.0571) (0.0851) (0.0578) (0.0858)
CAslt 0.0142 0.0238 0.0153* 0.0211 0.0164* 0.0197
(0.00892) (0.0154) (0.00873) (0.0150) (0.00865) (0.0148)
Income Criteria Less than 12k Less than 13k Less than 14k
Estimation OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.106* 0.223*** 0.109* 0.224*** 0.111* 0.235***
(0.0572) (0.0863) (0.0564) (0.0851) (0.0566) (0.0856)
CAslt 0.0159* 0.0192 0.0158* 0.0174 0.0150* 0.0162
(0.00850) (0.0147) (0.00836) (0.0143) (0.00825) (0.0140)
Income Criteria Less than 15k Less than 16k Less than 17k
notes:
a) Standard errors clustered at the level of the contact availability measure (schools) in parenthesis.
Significance level denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
b) For additional controls included see table 4 that exluded the variables conditioned on which
include: an income threshold, whether the parents claim: job seekers allowance, any income from
pension credit, income support and not claiming any working tax credit
c) Each pair of columns presents estimates analogous to 5 and 6 in table 6, each pair conditions on
the income specified b) but varies the income threshold.
A.3 Ex-ante peer characteristics
One way round the reflection problem is to use ex ante peer characteristics (Ammermller
and Pischke (2009), Brock and Durlauf (2001)). Therefore I re-estimate the baseline es-
timates in table 1 using the lag of the mean free school meal use of the ethnic language
group, FSM lit−1, in the peer measure. In particular Manski (1993) posits that social ef-
fects may act with a lag, whereas non-social forces act contemporaneously. The assumption
needed for this to be the case is that the environment should be relatively stable, such that
there is not large scale immigration of one particular ethnic language group, and that there
shouldn’t be large scale changes to the school system. The results, found in Table A3.
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Table A3: Ex-ante peer characteristics
Dependent Variable: Free School Meal Participation
Panel A: School Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CA Measure: School School School Year Year
Group Group
Estimation: OLS IV IV OLS IV
CAslt ∗ FSM lt−1 0.089*** 0.180*** 0.165*** 0.078*** 0.114***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
CAslt -0.012*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3383424 3362517 3379209 3383424 3324605
R-squared 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.046 0.046
Area x year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Language x year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument - MSOA LEA - School
Panel B: Area Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CA Measure: LSOA LSOA LSOA MSOA MSOA
Estimation OLS IV IV OLS IV
CAslt ∗ FSM lt−1 0.110*** 0.134*** 0.220*** 0.110*** 0.171***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
CAslt -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3366767 3362221 3362246 3366742 3366712
R-squared 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.057 0.057
Area x Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Language x Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument - MSOA LEA - LEA
notes:
a) see notes to table 3.
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A.4 Alternative Specifications
Table A4 presents a range alternative specifications based on different model specifications
and changing the definition of the peer group. Rather than estimating linear probability
models as we do in the baseline specifications, we estimate non-linear specifications, in row
1 we estimate a logit and row 2 a probit. Across all four locational measures of peer group
the effect is positive and significant.
In the baseline specifications, white British, other white groups, refused and not ob-
tained ethnicities were excluded from the sample. Rows 3-5 test the sensitivity of this
assumption. In row 3 all ethnicities are included, the largest group being white British
over 5,000,000 observations, as such for computational reasons we only estimate this for
2008. Including the additional ethnic groups, the largest of which is the white British
group, is likely to generate a large amount of noise into the peer group as there are too
many in this group to be a good measure of the peer group. The estimates are smaller
when all ethnic groups are included, as expected. Rows 4 and 5 go back to the baseline
specification, then include the other white group, and identifiable ethnicity respectively. In
both cases the results remain positive and significant.
Row 6, 7 and 8 check the sensitivity of the estimates to changing the peer group.
Again the estimates are robust to these various changes. Row 6 replaces the log contact
availability measure in the peer group with its level equivalent, rescaled by dividing by 100.
Row 7 replaces the peer group measure with the percentage of free school meal eligibility of
one’s ethnic language group (excluding the individual). Finally, returning to the baseline
peer group measure, we modify it in a number of ways. In the first column, rather than
restricting to either an area or school, we define the group over both the school and area
(LSOA). Column 2 excludes the year group from the school level peer group. Column 3
excludes the area from the school level peer group school and column 4 includes the area
(LSOA) but excludes the school. In all these cases the effects remain significant.
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Table A4: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yr Group School LSOA MSOA
Logit 0.662*** 0.659*** 0.941*** 0.703***
(0.0104) (0.00920) (0.0105) (0.00972)
Probit 0.426*** 0.423*** 0.587*** 0.455***
(0.00592) (0.00522) (0.00594) (0.00547)
Include All Ethnicities 0.0445*** 0.0562*** 0.0755*** 0.0703***
(0.00384) (0.00556) (0.00532) (0.00760)
Baseline inc other white background 0.0768*** 0.0854*** 0.104*** 0.101***
(0.00238) (0.00328) (0.00315) (0.00446)
Baseline inc refused and not obtained 0.0949*** 0.101*** 0.126*** 0.120***
(0.00250) (0.00340) (0.00321) (0.00444)
Levels/100 not logs 0.0501*** 0.0964*** 0.113*** 0.474***
(0.00674) (0.0176) (0.0239) (0.125)
% FSM of Ethnic Language Group 0.0879*** 0.490*** 0.518*** 0.572***
(0.00218) (0.00231) (0.00175) (0.00230)
School and LSOA School Not YGroup School Not LSOA LSOA not School
CAslt ∗ FSM lt 0.0412*** 0.0956*** 0.0879*** 0.0857***
(0.00276) (0.00365) (0.00371) (0.00368)
notes:
a) See notes to table 3
A.5 Non-Linear Effects
This section examines potential non-linear effects. In particular we look at the peer effect
for different percentages of free school meals below certain cut offs. The results are shown
in figure A1. The four lines represent four different measures of the peer group (year
group, school, LSOA, MSOA). It is estimated below the free school meal percentage at 5%
intervals. There is very little peer effect in schools below 5-10% of free school meal eligibility,
however this rapidly rises and reaches a plateau at around below 30-35%. Although there
is no way to test the different elements in this analysis, one would think that at the lower
level of free school meals there is greater stigma and less information, as one is in schools
where more are eligible, then the information would increase and stigma fall, resulting in
a greater effect of peers.
A.6 Regional Variation
In figure 2, it is shown that there are large variations in free school meal registration.
Therefore we examine two aspects of this regional variation. Panel A of Table A5 examines
the robustness of the estimates as a result of dropping each of the goverment organisation
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Figure A1: Peer Effects at different school levels percentages of Free School Meals
regions. Other than when the London region is dropped, each of the estimates reduce
slightly. However, they all remain positive and significant. In panel B the estimation is run
for each region separately. This gives a slightly varied picture from no effect in the North
East, to larger than average effects in the South East and East Midlands. Other than the
North East, which has a low sample size due to the sample being restricted to non-white
pupils, the effects remain positive and significant, albeit varying in magnitude.
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